| North Korea's Recent Nuclear Moves in Context: Actors, Interests, and Agendas |
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| Written by Elliot Storm |
| Monday, 20 October 2008 11:12 |
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As part of the 2008 North Korea Research Group speaker series, and in conjunction with the Trinity College International Relations Society at the University of Toronto, Dr. John S. Park, director of the Korea Working Group at the United States Institute of Peace, offered some insight into the possible interests guiding not only the North Korean leadership, but the strategic concerns of the United States, China and South Korea as well.
Supplementary Materials & Further Reading
Photos of the Event(photographed by Je Song Shin)
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As rumors of Kim Jong Il’s allegedly failing health abound, issues of leadership succession and the explicit transfer of power from Kim to an as yet unnamed individual or faction once more emerge as key areas of concern for North Korea watchers. Despite Pyongyang’s recent agreement to accept a verification protocol in return for removal from Washington’s State Sponsors of Terrorism List, further progress in the Six-Party Talks process remains unclear. Likewise, the ultimate motivations and objectives of North Korea’s leadership remain opaque and very much open to interpretation.
While it is true that by virtue of its nuclear program and geopolitical position North Korea has considerable ability to hedge against neighbouring states and other international players, the DPRK should not only be seen as a single actor at odds against a unified, homogenous international community. Rather, the differing interests of China, South Korea and the United States result in contradictory approaches to dealing with North Korea in terms of negotiation/engagement strategies, the provision of aid, and dealing with egregious human rights abuses. China, for example, is concerned with nonproliferation but is equally attentive to its own internal economic development priorities and does not want to see regime collapse or any kind of substantive leadership change not least because a refugee crisis would impede development activities in the three Chinese provinces bordering North Korea. Similarly, South Korea fears the possibility of shouldering the immense economic, humanitarian and political burdens of a failed DPRK, but is also wary of what it perceives to be China’s intent to absorb North Korea and transform it into a fourth province. With these interests in mind, both China and South Korea foresee and are invested in fostering gradual change rather than provoking a rapid rupture in North Korea’s authority structure. In contrast, the Bush administration seeks direct bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang and has modeled its interaction with the DPRK on counterproliferation strategies employed in other contexts – most notably, Libya. However, as Park noted, it tends to be problematic transposing one model on an entirely different situation.
Events in mid-October illustrate the extent to which North Korea’s tactical jostling seems to be paying off: within weeks of announcing it would resume its nuclear activities, the DPRK has once more retreated in the wake of meetings with American negotiators and has resolved to let United Nations inspectors back to Yongbyon. While there is growing speculation about how a new U.S. administration will specifically deal with North Korea, what is different from prior transitions is the web of Six-Party Talks agreements and negotiation mechanisms, which enhance regional crisis management capabilities. However, as Park notes, we need to manage expectations of the Six-Party Talks process facilitating rapid denuclearization in North Korea. With differing primary national interests among the six members, building and maintaining cooperation on key issues will remain a challenge.
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